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I. INTRODUCTION
The American system of arbitration is constantly evolving.1 From
the first formal arbitration tribunal in 1786—established by the New
York Chamber of Commerce2—to the creation of the Federal Arbitra* B.A., B.B.A., Mississippi State University, 2001; J.D., Florida State University,
2004. Many thanks to Beth Chamblee for the encouragement, support, and most of all, the
laughter. Thanks also to Professors Greg Mitchell and Jim Rossi for their time and insight, and to Dina Munasifi for taking the time to edit this piece. All errors, as they say,
are my own.
1. See FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION 3-8 (1948).
2. Id. at 4. Arbitration played an obscure and humble role in early American history.
“It did not become an integral part of the early social and economic development of the
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tion Act in 1925—passed to suppress judicial hostility towards arbitration3—the system has continuously adapted to accommodate
changing business practices and rising judicial concerns over the legitimacy of the institution. In fact, the system’s adaptation has been
so effective that the Supreme Court now recognizes a “national policy
favoring arbitration.”4
This “national policy” is the most recent phase of the arbitration
evolution, and it raises several concerns. Most significantly, lower
courts are relying on it to effectively eliminate any review of arbitration agreements under state laws of unconscionability.5 Consequently, banks, phone companies, and other consumer businesses are
implementing mandatory arbitration clauses that provide complete
immunization from both class actions and classwide arbitration. As
potential defendants, these companies hope that courts will force individual resolution of all consumer claims against them by upholding
their agreements to arbitrate. Such an exercise raises an important,
yet unanswered, question: To what extent should courts use the “national policy favoring arbitration”6 to protect consumer arbitration
agreements that prohibit all class relief?7

country nor a recognized institution of any consequence and its impact was negligible upon
the growth of justice in the country.” Id. at 6.
3. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995); see also Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000).
4. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Communications Int’l,
Inc., 294 F.3d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1090 (2002) (stating that arguments to overturn agreements based on the costs of individual arbitration and the preclusion of class actions—the typical unconscionability arguments—are “the sort of litany
that the Federal Arbitration Act is supposed to silence”); Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 896 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“Although we recognize the importance of
class actions as a tool for protecting consumers, we cannot ignore the strong policy that favors enforcement of arbitration provisions.”).
6. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
7. In June of 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court avoided making a decision on whether
classwide arbitration is permissible when an arbitration agreement is silent on the matter.
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003). Instead, the Court remanded the
case to the South Carolina Supreme Court with instructions that would allow the arbitrator to make the class relief determination. Id. at 2407. At the very least, this decision
proves that the Supreme Court is not completely hostile to classwide arbitration and it
preserves a limited state role in deciding what arbitration policies are acceptable in that
state. What the decision does not tell us, however, is how the Court will react when faced
with an arbitration agreement that expressly prohibits all class activity. Will it defer to the
“national policy favoring arbitration” and grant defendants virtual immunity from having
to provide class relief? Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. Or, will it recognize the growing dissent
among states, and several Supreme Court Justices, who favor taking some arbitration
oversight out of the federal sphere? As stated by the American Arbitration Association,
“[t]he arbitrability of class arbitrations where the parties’ agreement precludes such relief
is a developing area of the law.” American Arbitration Association Policy on Class Arbitration, at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15753&JSPaid=43408 (last visited Feb.
29, 2004). For information on the lower court’s decision in Bazzle, see Andrea Lockridge,
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The Supreme Court will have an opportunity to address this question when it resolves a split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
on the interplay of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the Federal
Communications Act (FCA), and state laws of unconscionability.8 Essentially, the Court will have to revisit previous decisions on what
type of role states play, if any, in determining arbitration policy
within their borders. Part II of this paper discusses the history of
federal preemption under the FAA and the growing dissatisfaction
with the Supreme Court’s federal preemption jurisprudence. Part III
addresses federal preemption under the Federal Communications
Act and how companies now use the FCA to shield arbitration
agreements from review under state laws of unconscionability. Part
III also discusses how the Supreme Court can develop a new federal
preemption policy—and suppress some of the dissension over its
prior preemption decisions—when it resolves the split between the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits. This new proposal still recognizes the
“national policy favoring arbitration,”9 and requires courts to respect
arbitration agreements accordingly. However, it returns greater authority over arbitration procedure to the states. Thus, when faced
with an arbitration agreement that prohibits both class actions and
classwide arbitration, courts may uphold the parties’ decision to arbitrate, but review state law to determine whether to permit arbitration to proceed on a classwide basis. Finally, Parts IV and V discuss
the justifications for such a proposal and suggest several safeguards
that states may want to enact to ensure that class arbitration proceedings are an efficient and effective method of alternative dispute
resolution.
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
When the Supreme Court announced the “national policy favoring
arbitration”10 nearly twenty years ago, it started a process of significantly federalizing the arbitration system.11 Soon, the “national” polThe Silent Treatment: Removing the Class Action from the Plaintiff’s Toolbox Without Ever
Saying a Word, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 255, 264-65.
8. Compare Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.
Ct. 53 (2003) (holding (1) that the Federal Communications Act does not preempt state
laws of unconscionability, and (2) that the FAA does preempt the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act’s ban on waivers of class actions, but that the FAA makes arbitration
agreements subject to state laws of unconscionability, which the 9th Circuit used to invalidate the parties’ agreement in this case), with Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th
Cir. 2002) (holding that the Federal Communication Act preempts state laws of unconscionability).
9. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
10. Id.
11. Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in
Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 176 (2002). Hayford and Palmiter argue for
allowing state law to control any areas of law outside the FAA’s “strong preemptive core.”
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icy became an “emphatic” policy,12 and other courts—both federal and
state—were expected to respect arbitration agreements to a point
where state law became almost insignificant. However, even though
federal preemption under the Federal Arbitration Act has expanded
significantly over the last two decades, the true extent of the FAA’s
preemptive effect is not entirely clear.
Section 2 of the FAA provides that all arbitration agreements are
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”13 Explaining
what constitutes “grounds as exist at law or in equity,” the Supreme
Court has emphasized that “[g]enerally applicable contract defenses,
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2 [of the FAA].”14
Nevertheless, courts easily disagree over how far they may go in using these generally applicable defenses to overturn parties’ arbitration agreements.15 After all, even the members of the Supreme Court
have not reached a unanimous decision on when states should defer
to the national policy and uphold agreements under the FAA.16 And,
some of the Supreme Court’s statements on preemption under the

Id. at 177. “[S]tate law in the form of default procedural rules holds out great promise, limited only by the gravitational pull of the FAA’s pro-arbitration imperative.” Id. at 178.
12. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631
(1985).
13. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
14. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996).
15. See Mandel v. Household Bank (Nevada), Nat’l Ass’n, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 386
(Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted):
Certainly, if a state’s law disfavors arbitration and creates unreasonable hurdles to the enforcement of arbitration agreements governed by the FAA, it is
preempted. But Nevada law favors arbitration of disputes, and therefore federal preemption is inapplicable. . . . [T]he proper course is to sever the ban on
class actions and enforce the remainder of the arbitration agreement.
Compare id., with Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 396 (Ct. App.
2003) (holding that “where a valid arbitration agreement governed by the FAA prohibits
classwide arbitration, section 2 of the FAA preempts a state court from applying state substantive law to strike the class action waiver from the agreement”), review granted en
banc, No. S113725, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 2105, at *1 (Cal. Rptr. Apr. 9, 2003); see also Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 896 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“Although we recognize the importance of class actions as a tool for protecting consumers, we cannot ignore
the strong policy that favors enforcement of arbitration provisions.”).
16. See Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 689 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 285 (Thomas,
J., dissenting); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist joined O’Connor’s dissent in Southland. Notably, Justices O’Connor,
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas are not alone in their displeasure over the Supreme Court’s
expansion of the FAA. In Allied-Bruce, twenty state attorneys general signed an amicus
brief asking the Court to overturn Southland. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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FAA have created uncertainty about the extent of a state lawmaking
role in the new arbitration system.17
Recently, lower courts have examined these questions quite frequently. The reason is that national consumer companies are hiding
behind federal laws—namely, the FAA and the FCA—in an attempt
to protect arbitration provisions that preclude all forms of class relief.18 Not surprisingly, these lower courts differ on what role federal
preemption should play in protecting such clauses from review under
state laws of unconscionability.19 This Section will give a brief description of the federal preemption doctrine, discuss federal preemption under the FAA, and then address the growing discontent over
the Supreme Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence.
A. Background on the Federal Preemption Doctrine
Article VI of the U.S. Constitution sets forth the principle that
federal law is supreme,20 and the preemption doctrine outlines the
boundaries of that principle when federal legislation leaves any
doubt. Therefore, “[t]he purpose of preemption doctrine . . . is to define the sphere of control between federal and state law when they
conflict, or appear to conflict.”21
Under the doctrine, federal law can displace state law in one of
three ways: (1) express preemption, (2) field preemption, or (3) con17. Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 176. On one hand, the Court interprets the
FAA to trump state laws that undermine the enforcement of arbitration. On the other, the
court recognizes states’ ability to employ generally applicable contract defenses to invalidate parties’ agreements. Id. at 176-77.
18. Some courts protect companies’ arbitration agreements under the guise of the
Federal Arbitration Act, holding that the FAA completely preempts state efforts to reform
contracts through their state laws of unconscionability. See, e.g., Discover Bank, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 396; see also Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 896. Some find that other federal laws,
such as the Federal Communications Act, have this same effect. See Boomer v. AT&T
Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2002).
19. Compare Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding (1) that the
Federal Communications Act does not preempt state laws of unconscionability, and (2) that
the FAA does preempt the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act’s ban on waivers of
class actions, but that the FAA makes arbitration agreements subject to state laws of unconscionability, which the 9th Circuit used to invalidate the parties’ agreement in this
case), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003), with Boomer, 309 F.3d at 404 (holding that the
Federal Communications Act preempts state laws of unconscionability); see also Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 896 (“Although we recognize the importance of class actions as a tool for
protecting consumers, we cannot ignore the strong policy that favors enforcement of arbitration provisions.”).
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
21. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L.
REV. 967, 968 (2002). “To the extent that the Supreme Court has something to say about
the power struggle of federalism, it speaks, partially at least, through its preemption decisions.” Id. at 969. “True preemption doctrine . . . was in its infancy until the unprecedented
legislative activity of the post-Depression era. Until that time, the Court was faced with
little truly comprehensive legislation of the kind that the 1930s and 1940s produced.” Id.
at 973-74.
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flict preemption.22 Express preemption exists where a federal statute
explicitly withdraws specific powers from the states.23 The Supreme
Court favors a narrow reading of statutes that attempt to keep power
in the federal sphere, believing that courts should apply a presumption against preemption when the statutes interfere with the states’
traditional powers.24 An inquiry under the principle of express preemption requires a court to interpret the meaning of the preemptive
clause and determine whether Congress actually had the power to
pass such legislation.25
Absent explicit preemptive text, courts may still conclude that a
federal statute is so comprehensive that Congress left no room for
supplementary state regulation.26 This so-called field preemption occurs when a statute or regulation reflects a dominant federal interest
that precludes enforcement of any similar state laws on the subject.27
Since the statute contains no explicit statement of preemption, a field
preemption inquiry requires the court to find preemption implicit
within the federal law.28 Because of the uncertainty in finding an implied statutory intent, courts hesitate to read preemption into a federal statute.29
Finally, even when Congress has not completely occupied the
field, courts may still infer preemption when federal law and state
law conflict. Conflict preemption exists when “compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,”30 or where
22. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000); see also Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
23. Nelson, supra note 22, at 226.
24. Id. at 227. But see Davis, supra note 21, at 968 (arguing that the Supreme Court
actually holds a presumption in favor of preemption).
25. Nelson, supra note 22, at 226-27. In cases involving the FAA and FCA, for example, courts examine Congress’ regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g.,
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (stating that the FAA rested “on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause”).
26. Nelson, supra note 22, at 227 (citing English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79
(1990)).
27. Id. (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
28. Id.
29. Id. The Supreme Court developed the field preemption doctrine in Southern Railway Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1912). Reid involved freight regulations under the Interstate Commerce Act. Mrs. Reid asked Southern Railway to ship several packages from
North Carolina to West Virginia, but Southern refused to ship the packages until it could
establish a rate for the shipment (no federal regulation existed to establish rates for that
route). Mrs. Reid sued under a North Carolina statute that awarded damages—$25 a
day—against rail companies that refused to accept packages, and she won. Id. at 431-34.
Southern appealed the decision all the way to the Supreme Court, which concluded that
even though no federal law specifically applied to the plaintiff’s claim, the Interstate
Commerce Act’s broad regulatory authority was enough to evidence that Congress had occupied the field. It did not matter that the state regulation complemented the federal
scheme. Id. at 437-38.
30. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). “The test
of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must
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state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”31 While the “physical
impossibility” portion of this test is fairly narrow, the “obstacle” half
is fairly broad.32 It potentially applies not only in cases where state
and federal law conflict, but also where courts think that the effects
of state law obstruct the intended accomplishments of federal law.33
In fact, the Supreme Court relies on obstacle preemption to uphold
arbitration agreements under the FAA, even when such agreements
are offensive to state law or policies.34
B. The Expanding Preemptive Effect of the FAA
When Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925, it attempted to overcome a history of judicial hostility toward predispute
arbitration agreements.35 The FAA has been an undeniable success
in that regard. Supreme Court decisions over the last seventy-five
years have relied on broad interpretations of the FAA to establish
arbitration as a near sacred institution for dispute resolution in the
United States.36 In fact, the Court has employed these broad interpretations to make the FAA applicable in both federal and state
courts, effectively expanding the preemptive scope of the FAA far beyond Congress’ original intent.37

give way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives.” Id. at
142.
31. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
32. Nelson, supra note 22, at 228.
33. Id. at 228-29.
34. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (invalidating a
Montana statutory notice requirement). The Court holds that inconsistent state laws
should not apply when they pose obstacles to the implementation of comprehensive federal
legislation such as the FAA. See id. at 688.
35. See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 180. Although arbitration is an extremely old form of dispute resolution—dating back to ancient Greece—the judicial hostility grew out of the lack of available records of how parties used arbitration and a lack of
any organizing arbitral body. See KELLOR, supra note 1, at 3-5.
36. According to the Supreme Court, the FAA’s support for arbitration is even more
powerful when dealing with international disputes. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506 (1974).
37. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 420 (1967) (Black,
J., dissenting) (stating that “there are clear indications in the legislative history that the
Act was not intended to make arbitration agreements enforceable in state courts”); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
One rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA’s. That history establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts, derived, Congress believed,
largely from the federal power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
In 1925[,] Congress emphatically believed arbitration to be a matter of “procedure.” At hearings on the Act congressional Subcommittees were told: “The
theory on which you do this is that you have the right to tell the Federal courts
how to proceed.”
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Originally, Congress passed the FAA as a procedural statute that
applied only in federal courts.38 “State arbitration law continued to
govern in state courts, even if the contract involved interstate commerce.”39 However, to develop a “national policy favoring arbitration,”40 the Supreme Court had to adopt a more liberal interpretation
of the FAA after its 1938 decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.41
Erie eliminated the federal courts’ power to create national commercial policy in diversity cases, and held that only state procedural law
applied in state courts.42 Therefore, after Erie, if the Court interpreted the FAA as a procedural statute that was based on Congress’
power to regulate federal courts, then the FAA could not apply in
state courts or federal diversity actions. However, if the Court interpreted the FAA as substantive federal law that was based on Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, for example, then the Court would
make it possible for the FAA to apply in both.43 Thus, after Erie, the
Supreme Court had to decide: (1) whether the FAA was procedural or
substantive federal law, and (2) whether Congress passed the FAA
under its authority to regulate federal courts or under its powers to
regulate interstate commerce.44
The Court addressed these issues for the first time in 1945 when
it decided Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.45 In York, the Supreme Court
held that federal courts sitting in diversity should not apply federal
rules that substantially affect the enforcement of rights given by the
state.46 Accordingly, outcome determinative state arbitration standards would trump the FAA’s arbitration mandate in diversity
cases.47 Thus, the Court’s decision in York made it seem like the
Court would continue with a narrow interpretation of the FAA.

Id. (citing Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and
H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 17 (1924) (testimony of Mr. Cohen, American Bar Association)); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 701.
38. Drahozal, supra note 37, at 701. Notably, the FAA does not create independent
federal question jurisdiction. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 n.9; Hayford & Palmiter, supra
note 11, at 184.
39. Drahozal, supra note 37, at 701 (citing 1 IAN R. MACNEIL, ET AL., FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW § 14.1 n.1 (Supp. 1999)). Currently, if an arbitration agreement even affects interstate commerce then the FAA governs. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995). Thus, state courts deciding arbitration cases have to perform
a “reverse-Erie” analysis to determine when they have to apply the FAA.
40. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
41. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
42. Id. at 78.
43. Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 651 (1996).
44. Id.
45. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
46. Id. at 109.
47. See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 186-87.
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Twelve years later, however, the Court applied York’s “outcome
determinative” test in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America and
reached a slightly different conclusion.48 In Bernhardt, the Court
found that the FAA was substantive federal law under York—which
presumably would trump outcome determinative state arbitration
standards—because it substantially affected causes of action created
by the state.49 However, the Court refused to apply the FAA in this
case because the underlying transaction did not involve interstate
commerce.50 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas emphasized
that courts should interpret the FAA narrowly to avoid intruding on
a state’s right to regulate substantive law.51 Nevertheless, even
though the Court did not apply the FAA, by characterizing the FAA
as substantive federal law, Bernhardt opened the door for the Court
to apply the FAA to future diversity cases and state court actions as
well.52
The progressive federalization of the FAA continued when, eight
years after Bernhardt, in 1965, the Supreme Court decided that federal policy would in fact overrule conflicting state policy, even if federal policy would determine the outcome of the case.53 The Court soon
applied this new rule in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing, a federal diversity action that was a significant piece
of the FAA federalization process.54 In Prima Paint, the majority
stated that “it is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration
statute is based upon and confined to the incontestable federal foundations of control over interstate commerce.”55 Thus, since the Court
decided that Congress passed the FAA under the Commerce Clause,
FAA standards—not conflicting state standards—would thereafter
48. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). Bernhardt was also a diversity action. Id. at 199.
49. Id. at 199; see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 26 n.32 (1983) (stating that the FAA creates a body of federal substantive law).
50. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 200-02. The FAA only applies to maritime contracts or contracts involving interstate commerce. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). However, the Supreme Court
recently interpreted § 2’s involving interstate commerce requirement to include any contract that affected interstate commerce. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995). This liberal interpretation of § 2 essentially expands the FAA to
cover even contracts that only affect intrastate commerce. See id.; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (sustaining the federal power to regulate production of wheat
where production was not intended in any part for interstate commerce but wholly for consumption on the individual’s farm).
51. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202-04.
52. Sternlight, supra note 43, at 651-52.
53. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965) (“The purpose of the Erie doctrine,
even as extended in York and Ragan, was never to bottle up federal courts with ‘outcomedeterminative’ and ‘integral-relations’ stoppers—when there are ‘affirmative countervailing [federal] considerations’ and when there is a Congressional mandate . . . supported by
constitutional authority.”) (quoting Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d
759, 764 (5th Cir. 1973)).
54. See 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
55. Id. at 405.

1014

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1005

govern the legitimacy of arbitration clauses in federal diversity cases
involving interstate commerce.56 Moreover, as Justice Black noted in
his dissent, “when Congress exercises its authority to enact substantive federal law under the Commerce Clause, it normally creates
rules that are enforceable in state as well as federal courts.”57 Therefore, even though Prima Paint was a diversity action, and could not
expressly find that the FAA should apply in state court, “the conclusion that the FAA was substantive law based on the Commerce
Clause would predictably require application of the FAA in state
court under the Supremacy Clause.”58
Accordingly, Prima Paint signaled two fundamental changes in
the Supreme Court’s view on federal preemption under the FAA.59
First, making the FAA applicable in federal diversity cases—even if
it affected the outcome of a case—reflected a willingness to draw jurisdictional lines that strongly favored arbitration.60 Second, the decision eliminated all possibilities of applying state arbitration law in
federal court.61 However, forum selection was still extremely important after Prima Paint.62 Since the FAA did not apply in state court,
and since state arbitration law did not apply in federal court, an arbitration clause might be valid in federal court under the FAA but
worthless in state court under state law.63 This would eventually
change with the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Southland Corp.
v. Keating.64
Southland is perhaps the most controversial case in the Supreme
Court’s history of arbitration jurisprudence. It involved individual
and class actions brought by 7-Eleven franchisees against the franchisor—Southland—for fraud, breach of contract, and violation of
disclosure requirements under the California Franchise Investment
Law (CFIL).65 Southland moved to compel arbitration according to a
clause in the franchise agreement which stated that “[a]ny . . . claim
arising out of or relating to this Agreement . . . shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration
Association.”66 The California Supreme Court granted the motion to
compel arbitration on all issues except for those arising under the

56.
57.
420).
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (citing Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at
Sternlight, supra note 43, at 657.
Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 189.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
Id. at 4.
Id.
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CFIL, interpreting California’s Franchise Investment Law to require
judicial consideration of claims arising under that statute.67 The
court also concluded that the CFIL did not conflict with the FAA.68
The United States Supreme Court, however, disagreed and found
that even claims under the CFIL were subject to the arbitration
agreement. The Court stated that if the CFIL rendered arbitration
agreements involving commerce unenforceable, then it would conflict
with § 2 of the FAA.69 “In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress
declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”70 Therefore, according to the Court, the FAA now applied in
state courts as long as the underlying contract involved interstate
commerce.71
In subsequent decisions, the Court would rely on the new “national policy” from Southland as the underpinning of its preemption
jurisprudence.72 In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, the Supreme Court completed its revision of the FAA by interpreting § 2’s
coverage of transactions involving interstate commerce73 to also include transactions affecting commerce.74 This expansive interpretation of § 2 significantly increased the scope of the FAA and arguably
eliminated the need for making a distinction between interstate and
intrastate transactions.75 Thus, Allied-Bruce completed the Supreme
Court’s fifty-year expansion of the FAA. Almost any arbitration

67. Id. Based on the superior court’s decision, the franchisees petitioned the California Court of Appeal to allow arbitration to proceed on a classwide basis. Id. at 4. The court
of appeal found that no “insurmountable obstacle” existed to prevent classwide arbitration
and it issued a writ of mandate ordering the superior court to conduct class certification
proceedings. Id. at 5. On appeal from the court of appeal’s decision, the California Supreme
Court agreed that classwide arbitration is feasible and it also remanded the case to the superior court for class certification procedures. Id. at 5. The U.S. Supreme Court, however,
refused to hear the classwide arbitration issue, stating that Southland did not contend,
and the California Courts did not decide, whether classwide arbitration would conflict with
the FAA. Id. at 8-9.
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id. at 10.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 192 (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987)).
73. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). The FAA applies to any “maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.” Id.
74. 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995); see also Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 123 S. Ct.
2037 (2003) (accepting an equally broad definition of transactions involving commerce in a
dispute between an Alabama builder and an Alabama lender).
75. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273-74; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) (sustaining the federal power to regulate production of wheat where production was
not intended in any part for interstate commerce but wholly for consumption on the individual’s farm).
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agreement—regardless of judicial forum or interstate/intrastate nature—may now fall under the FAA and its national policy in favor of
arbitration.76
C. Fifty Years of Dissent
Justice Frankfurter was one of the first Supreme Court Justices to
recognize the Court’s attempt at expanding the preemptive effect of
the Federal Arbitration Act beyond Congress’ original intent.77 He believed that the FAA—which Congress passed in 1925—rested solely
on Congress’ ability to pass general federal law that would be applicable in federal diversity actions.78 However, since the Supreme
Court’s 1938 decision in Erie negated Congress’ power to pass such
laws, Frankfurter believed that the FAA was unconstitutional as applied in diversity cases.79 Justice Black, in a dissent joined by Justices Douglas and Stewart, picked up on this line of reasoning in his
Prima Paint dissent when he criticized the majority for “statutory
mutilation.”80 Disapproving of the majority’s opinion that Congress
created substantive federal law when it drafted the FAA, Justice
Black stated:
[T]here are clear indications in the legislative history that the Act
was not intended to make arbitration agreements enforceable in
state courts or to provide an independent federal-question basis for
jurisdiction in federal courts apart from diversity jurisdiction. The
absence of both of these effects—which normally follow from legislation of federal substantive law—seems to militate against the
view that Congress was creating a body of federal substantive
law.81

Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion almost twenty years later
in Southland, agreed that Congress passed the FAA as a procedural
measure; however, Stevens also believed that intervening developments compelled a finding that the FAA was now substantive federal

76. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The reading of § 2
adopted today will displace many state statutes carefully calibrated to protect consumers .
. . .”). In Allied-Bruce, twenty state attorneys general signed an amicus brief asking the
Court to overturn Southland. Id. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 208 (1956) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should construe the FAA so as to avoid its application in diversity cases).
78. See id.
79. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 416-18 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 416 (Black, J., dissenting). “[I]t is clear that Congress in passing the Act
relied primarily on its power to create general federal rules to govern federal courts.” Id. at
418 (Black, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 420 (Black, J., dissenting).
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law.82 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens did advocate leaving a role in
developing arbitration policies to the states, finding that the FAA
“leaves room for the implementation of certain substantive state policies that would be undermined by enforcing certain categories of arbitration clauses.”83 Justices O’Connor and Rehnquist, dissenting in
Southland, agreed. However, they took it a step further, arguing that
the FAA should not apply in state court at all, and declaring that the
majority opinion, “utterly fail[ed] to recognize the clear congressional
intent underlying the FAA.”84
Ever since Southland, Justice O’Connor has continuously expressed her distaste for the Court’s preemption jurisprudence. In Allied-Bruce, for example, she noted that “over the past decade, the
Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead,
case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”85 Notably, other current
members of the Court recognize the validity of O’Connor’s position
and have expressed a desire to preserve a greater state role in deciding arbitration policies. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, for
example, all agree that the FAA should not apply in state courts, and
they support the idea of reversing Southland.86
Thus, given the growing dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court’s
preemption decisions,87 it seems likely that something will soon
change. As it stands, four Justices support overturning Southland.88

82. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). “Although Justice [O’Connor]’s review of the legislative history of
the Federal Arbitration Act demonstrates that the 1925 Congress that enacted the statute
viewed the statute as essentially procedural in nature, I am persuaded that the intervening developments in the law compel the conclusion that the Court has reached.” Id.
83. Id. at 18. Justice Stevens also stated that courts “should not refuse to exercise independent judgment concerning the conditions under which an arbitration agreement . . .
can be held invalid as contrary to public policy simply because the source of the substantive law to which the arbitration agreement attaches is a State rather than the Federal
Government.” Id. at 21.
84. Id. at 22-23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined Justice
O’Connor’s dissent. See id.
85. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Allied-Bruce involved the Court’s interpretation of “transactions involving commerce.” O’Connor stated her belief that the FAA should only apply in federal court, but
concurred with the Court’s judgment to maintain a uniform FAA application standard in
state and federal courts. Id. at 282.
86. See id. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 285-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Southland, 465 U.S. at 22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
87. Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas are not alone in their displeasure over the Supreme Court’s expansion of the FAA. In Allied-Bruce, twenty state attorneys general signed an amicus brief asking the Court to overturn Southland. Allied-Bruce,
513 U.S. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. See Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 689 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Allied-Bruce,
513 U.S. at 284 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 285-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting); South-
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While the Court might not go that far, it might reach a compromise,
leaving intact the “national policy favoring arbitration,”89 but returning some limited power over arbitration procedure to the states. Part
III discusses a split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that
provides the opportunity for the Court to make this change.
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS ACT
The Supreme Court will have an opportunity to address some of
the problems with Southland and answer some important questions
about waivers of class relief, when it resolves a circuit split over the
preemptive effect that the Federal Communications Act (FCA) may
or may not have over the FAA and state laws of unconscionability.90
The split arises from an AT&T Consumer Services Agreement that
prohibited its customers from pursuing class actions and classwide
arbitration.91 The Seventh Circuit upheld the agreement under the
FCA,92 and the Ninth Circuit invalidated the agreement under the
FAA.93
Resolving this split will allow the Supreme Court to develop a new
preemption policy that respects the interests of both plaintiffs and
defendants by: (1) encouraging courts to respect the parties’ decision
to arbitrate, yet (2) returning limited powers to the states to regulate
the procedural aspects of arbitration. Essentially, the new policy will
continue to recognize the “national policy favoring arbitration,”94
while allowing state law to decide whether to permit arbitration to
proceed on a classwide basis.
A. The Federal Communications Act and the Filed Rate Doctrine
Congress passed the Federal Communications Act of 193495 partially in an effort to address AT&T’s virtual monopoly over the nation’s telephone services industry.96 Under the Act, long distance carland, 465 U.S. at 22 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist joined O’Connor’s dissent
in Southland. Id.
89. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
90. Compare Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding (1) that the
Federal Communications Act does not preempt state laws of unconscionability, and (2) that
the FAA does preempt the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act’s ban on waivers of
class actions, but that the FAA makes arbitration agreements subject to state laws of unconscionability, which the 9th Circuit used to invalidate the parties’ agreement in this
case), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003), with Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir.
2002) (holding that the Federal Communication Act preempts state laws of unconscionability).
91. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130; Boomer, 309 F.3d at 408.
92. Boomer, 309 F.3d at 408.
93. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130.
94. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
95. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615 (2000).
96. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130.
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riers—namely, AT&T—had to file all terms and conditions of their
customer service agreements with the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC).97 Widely known as the “filed rate doctrine,”98 this
provision of the FCA ensured that “all purchasers of communications
services receive[d] the same federally regulated rates” by prohibiting
regulated entities from charging rates other than those listed in their
duly filed tariff.99 In other words, the filed rate doctrine prevented
consumers from having to pay unequal or discriminatory rates based
on their geographic location.100
By the late 1970s, however, technological advances had reduced
entry costs into the telecommunications market, and some of AT&T’s
new competitors began voicing concerns that a continuation of the
filed rate doctrine imposed unnecessary costs on new entrants.101
Based on these complaints, the FCC adopted a policy of “detariffing”102 and—over a fifteen year period103—began exempting “nondominant carriers” from the FCA filing requirement.104 However, the
Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the FCA did not give the
FCC the power to issue these exemptions.105 As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, the FCC had to wait for Congress to act if it
wanted to suspend the filed rate doctrine.106
Two years after the Supreme Court denied the FCC the power to
exempt certain carriers,107 Congress responded by passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996.108 The purpose of the Act was to open all
telecommunications markets and provide for a pro-competitive, deregulated national policy framework.109 Through the Act, Congress
gave the FCC express authority to refrain from applying the filed
97. See Boomer, 309 F.3d at 408; see also 47 U.S.C. § 203 (2000) (“filed rate doctrine”).
98. The filed rate doctrine is the common name for the section of the Federal Communications Act that was codified in § 203 of the United States Code. See Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 203 (2000).
99. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130-31 (alteration in original) (quoting ICOM Holding, Inc.
v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 238 F.3d 219, 221 (2d Cir. 2001)).
100. See id. at 1131.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1132-33. The FCC’s new policy started off as “mandatory detariffing” for all
nondominant carriers, but the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
FCC did not have such powers under the FCA. See id. at 1132; MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.
FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Afterwards, the FCC attempted to enact a policy of “permissive detariffing,” but the Supreme Court invalidated this new policy as well.
See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1132; MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 512 U.S. 218, 234
(1994).
103. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1132.
104. Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 2002).
105. See MCI, 512 U.S. at 234.
106. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1132.
107. See MCI, 512 U.S. at 234.
108. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
109. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 113 (1996) (emphasis added).
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rate doctrine if the FCC determined that enforcement of the provision was not necessary to ensure that the charges and practices of
carriers were just and reasonable.110
Under its new authority, the FCC issued a series of orders notifying AT&T—and the other long distance carriers—that they no longer
had to comply with the filed rate doctrine.111 Instead, carriers had to
establish contracts covering rates, terms, and conditions of service
directly with their customers.112 Unclear on the effects of the order,
AT&T asked the FCC to clarify whether it intended to subject telecommunication contracts to state contract law.113 In response, the
FCC stated that the FCA “continues to govern determinations as to
whether rates, terms, and conditions for interstate . . . services are
just and reasonable.”114 However, the Commission went on to state
that “consumers may have remedies under state consumer protection
and contract laws as to issues regarding the legal relationship between the carrier and customer.”115
Soon after the FCC’s response, AT&T started mailing its customers a Consumer Services Agreement (CSA) containing all rates,
terms, and conditions of service for AT&T’s state-to-state and international long distance plans.116 The CSA also described AT&T’s new
binding arbitration process.117 This provision of the CSA spawned the
litigation in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.118
The CSA’s binding arbitration provision barred all of AT&T’s long
distance customers from pursuing claims against the company
through either class action or classwide arbitration.119 Several consumers in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits sued AT&T, alleging that
the company’s elimination of potential class relief through mandatory arbitration clauses violated their respective state laws of unconscionability.120 AT&T claimed that the Federal Communications Act
mandated federal regulation of long distance contracts, and there-

110. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1) (2000).
111. See Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, 14 F.C.C.R. 6004 (1999); Interstate,
Interexchange Marketplace, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,014 (1997); Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, 11 F.C.C.R. 20,730 (1996).
112. See Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 409 (7th Cir. 2002).
113. Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,014, 15,056 (1997) (order
on reconsideration). AT&T’s request for clarification was based on one statement in the
original FCC order: “[C]onsumers will also be able to pursue remedies under state consumer protection and contract laws.” Id.
114. Id. at 15,057.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Boomer, 309 F.3d at 409.
117. Id.
118. See Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.
Ct. 53 (2003); Boomer, 309 F.3d at 408.
119. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130; Boomer, 309 F.3d at 408.
120. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130; Boomer, 309 F.3d at 408.

2004]

CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

1021

fore, that the FCA preempted state laws that would undermine their
Consumer Services Agreement.121 The Seventh Circuit agreed and
upheld the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.122 The Ninth Circuit,
however, decided that the FAA, and its exception for applying state
laws of general applicability (i.e., unconscionability), should prevail
over the FCA.123 Based on this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the arbitration agreement under California’s laws of unconscionability.124
As the following Sections explain, the Seventh Circuit came to the
appropriate substantive conclusion by upholding the parties’ agreement to arbitrate. However, it followed the wrong procedure by basing its decision on the preemptive power of the FCA. It should have
taken the path of the Ninth Circuit and reviewed the validity of the
parties’ agreement under the FAA. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, however, it should have stricken any unconscionable provisions rather
than invalidating the entire agreement.
B. The Seventh & Ninth Circuits’ Views on the Preemptive Effect of
the Federal Communications Act
AT&T insisted that a state law challenge to the legality of the
CSA violated Congress’ objective in creating the Communications
Act, and that it specifically conflicted with the objectives of sections
201 and 202 of the FCA.125 Sections 201 and 202 place substantive
prohibitions on a carrier’s ability to employ unreasonable or discriminatory rates,126 and AT&T claimed that these provisions preempt any state law challenges because they show a congressional in-

121. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130; Boomer, 309 F.3d at 408.
122. Boomer, 309 F.3d at 418 n.6.
123. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1152; see also Note, State Regulation of Radio and Television, 73
HARV. L. REV. 386, 388-89 (1959) (arguing that when the FCA does not specifically cover
an activity, “state regulation should be permitted at least until the federal government
chooses to act”).
124. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1152.
125. See id. at 1137; Boomer, 309 F.3d at 417.
126. See Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-202 (2000). Section
201(b) states:
All charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection
with such communication service, shall be just and reasonable, and any such
charge, practice, classification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is
declared to be unlawful.
Section 202(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities,
or services for or in connection with like communication service, directly or indirectly, by any means or device, or to make or give any undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage to any particular person, class of persons, or locality,
or to subject any particular person, class of persons, or locality to any undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.
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tent for federal law to regulate telecommunications contracts.127 The
Seventh Circuit agreed for three reasons.
First, it stated that sections 201 and 202, and the FCA in general,
demonstrate a congressional intent that long-distance customers
should “receive uniform rates, terms[,] and conditions of service.”128
Allowing state law challenges to the arbitration agreement would result in customers in different states “receiving different terms based
on their locality.”129 According to the Seventh Circuit, this violates §
202’s prohibition of providing preferences based on geographic location.130 Second, AT&T’s implementation of an arbitration clause supposedly allows it to offer lower rates to customers.131 Accordingly, allowing state law challenges to the arbitration agreement might result in varying rate structures for customers in different states, and
the court felt that this would also be a violation of § 202.132 Finally, §
201 declares any rates, terms, and conditions that are unjust and unreasonable to be unlawful.133 According to the Seventh Circuit, this
demonstrates Congress’ intent that federal law should govern terms
and conditions of telecommunication service contracts.134 Based on
this reasoning, the court upheld the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.135
While the Seventh Circuit’s decision to send the parties to arbitration was substantively correct, it was procedurally inaccurate because it held that the FCA preempts state laws of unconscionability.
The court should have upheld the parties’ agreement to arbitrate under the FAA, and then reviewed state law to determine whether to
allow the arbitration to proceed on a classwide basis.136 As the Ninth
Circuit held, the Federal Communications Act does not preempt state
laws.137 While sections 201 and 202 of the 1934 Act unquestionably
demonstrate a congressional intent that customers should receive
127. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1137-38; Boomer, 309 F.3d at 418.
128. Boomer, 309 F.3d at 418.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 419.
131. See id. at 418. AT&T did not offer any empirical evidence to support this claim.
132. Id.
133. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).
134. Boomer, 309 F.3d at 418.
135. Id. at 424.
136. On this point, the Ninth Circuit also made an inappropriate decision; it invalidated the parties’ entire agreement. Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003). The Ninth Circuit should have sent the parties to
arbitration and let state law determine whether arbitration may proceed on a classwide
basis. California, by the way, is one of only a few states that so far has explicitly accepted
classwide arbitration as a legitimate form of alternative dispute resolution. See Blue Cross
of Cal. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 794 (Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that the
FAA does not preempt California’s state law that allows classwide arbitration when the
arbitration agreement is silent on the issue).
137. Ting, 319 at 1152.
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reasonable rates, terms, and services,138 these provisions have no preemptive effect without the filed rate doctrine.139 When Congress
passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and gave the FCC the
power to eliminate the filed rate doctrine140—which was the procedural mechanism for enforcing sections 201 and 202—it eliminated
the preemptive effect of the FCA.141 While the substantive principles
of sections 201 and 202 remain intact, consumers may now rely on
state law to enforce these provisions.142 Even the FCC admitted that
“consumers may have remedies under state consumer protection and
contract laws.”143
C. Using the Circuit Split to Define the State’s Role in Proscribing
Contractual Prohibitions of Classwide Arbitration
Because the FCA does not preempt state laws, the Seventh Circuit should have reviewed the arbitration agreement under the Federal Arbitration Act. Based on the Supreme Court’s “national policy
favoring arbitration,”144 the court still could have upheld the parties’
decision to arbitrate. The only difference is that the court could also
have allowed state laws—Illinois laws in this case—to determine
whether the arbitration should proceed on a classwide basis, regardless of the contractual prohibition on class relief.145
If the Supreme Court follows this reasoning when it resolves the
circuit split, it can eliminate a great deal of the dissension over
Southland and prevent companies from using mandatory arbitration

138. Id. at 1138.
139. Id. at 1138-40.
140. See Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 203 (2000).
141. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1139. The substantive effects of sections 201-202 remain after the 1996 Act. The only difference is that parties may now enforce these provisions in
state court. Id. at 1138-43.
142. Id. at 1138-43.
143. Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,014, 15,057 (1997) (order
on reconsideration) (emphasis added).
144. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
145. Generally, courts refer to arbitration as a matter of contract and they respect the
parties’ agreements accordingly. See, e.g., Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d
814, 819 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that under the congressional policy embodied in the
FAA, parties may contractually waive their right to class action litigation). However, in
situations where companies are completely prohibiting class relief through restrictive arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts, courts should not defer to the parties’ right to contract. Placing complete prohibitions on class relief in an arbitration agreement is against
public policy because, among other things, it allows companies to avoid accountability for
corporate misdeeds. See Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867-68 (Ct. App.
2002); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 279-80 (W. Va. 2002). In this type of
situation, courts should defer to state law to determine whether arbitration should proceed
on a classwide basis. See generally Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 176 (arguing for
a greater state role in commercial arbitration); see also, Note, supra note 123, at 388-89.
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to create “virtual immunity”146 from class proceedings. While this approach still recognizes Southland’s “national policy” in favor of arbitration,147 and requires courts to respect arbitration agreements accordingly, it returns power over arbitration procedure to the states.
Therefore, under this approach, states still may not enact substantive rules that undermine the enforceability of the parties’ decision to
arbitrate, but states may enact procedural rules dealing with the
fairness of the arbitration process itself. Thus, when faced with an
arbitration agreement that prohibits both class actions and classwide
arbitration, courts may uphold the parties’ decision to arbitrate, but
review state law to determine whether to permit arbitration to proceed on a classwide basis, regardless of any contractual prohibitions
on class relief. Such a solution serves the dual interest of advancing
the parties’ decision to arbitrate—thereby respecting the “national
policy” in favor of arbitration148—while preserving some authority
over arbitration procedure for the states.149 Consequently, if states
accept classwide arbitration as an effective method of dispute resolution, companies will no longer be able to use binding arbitration to
avoid class relief.150
IV. JUSTIFYING STATE CONTROL AND CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION
THROUGH PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMICS
Currently, only California, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina
have explicitly accepted classwide arbitration as an effective method
of dispute resolution.151 However, when faced with a choice of accepting classwide arbitration or allowing companies to avoid class relief,
presumably most—if not all—states will accept classwide arbitration.
This Section explains the justifications for allowing states to prohibit

146. Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867 (stating that class relief prohibitions create “virtual immunity from class or representative actions despite their potential merit”).
147. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
148. Id.
149. See generally Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11 (arguing for a greater state role
in commercial arbitration); see also, Note, supra note 123, at 388-89.
150. The draft reporter’s notes for the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, which was recently adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, indicates that it may be appropriate for courts to invalidate arbitration provisions that use the
elimination of class relief to undermine consumer rights. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, PROPOSED REVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, DRAFT FOR APPROVAL 36-37 (2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/ulc/uarba/arb0500.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2004); see also Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1955-67
(1996) (arguing that companies are exploiting arbitration in ways that are detrimental to
the system).
151. See Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360 (S.C. 2002), overturned
on other grounds, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003); Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr.
2d 779, 781 (Ct. App. 1998); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 867
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
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preclusions of class relief, discredits the justification that consumer
businesses use to validate their use of class relief preclusions, and
leads into a discussion on some aspects of classwide arbitration that
states may want to consider when adopting the classwide arbitral
system.
A. Maintaining the “National Policy” while Proscribing
Prohibitions on Class Relief
An important aspect of the proposal for returning greater powers
over arbitration procedure to the states is that it respects the “national policy favoring arbitration.”152 The Supreme Court spent seventy-five years developing this policy and it will not abandon it overnight. However, several justices, and many states, disagree with the
Court’s expansion of the FAA, and it seems likely that the Court’s
policy will soon change.153 Adopting an approach that requires states
to respect the parties’ decision to arbitrate while allowing state law
to determine whether arbitration should proceed on a classwide basis
is a practical compromise. It maintains the “national policy”154 while
granting limited procedural powers to the states.155 More importantly, it also respects general public policy in favor of allowing parties to proceed on a classwide basis.
B. Public Policy as Justification for Reform
“Classwide arbitration, as Sir Winston Churchill said of democracy, must be evaluated, not in relation to some ideal but in relation
to its alternatives.”156 If the alternative is to force hundreds of con-

152. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
153. See supra notes 77-89.
154. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
155. In Arbitration Federalism, Professors Hayford and Palmiter suggest a two-part
“blueprint” for determining what role state law should have in the arbitration process.
Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 203. “First, [the blueprint] is prohibitive: state law
can neither be hostile to arbitration nor undermine the parties’ agreement. Second, [the
blueprint] is hortatory: state law must seek to facilitate arbitration and to give content and
effect to the parties’ choice.” Id. This Comment’s proposal meets both criteria by respecting
the “national policy” in favor of arbitration, by respecting the parties’ decision to arbitrate,
and by facilitating classwide arbitration. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10; see Hayford &
Palmiter, supra note 11, at 203.
156. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action,
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 44 (2000) (quoting Keating v.
Superior Court, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360, 377 (1982)). At least nine courts—most of which are in
California—have held that arbitration clauses precluding class relief contributed to a finding of unconscionability or to a finding that the arbitration clause must be severed. See
Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003);
Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2003); Comb v. PayPal,
Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175-76 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Acorn v. Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F.
Supp. 2d 1160, 1170-71 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Luna v. Household Fin. Corp., 236 F. Supp. 2d
1166, 1182-83 (W.D. Wash. 2002); Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d
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sumers to try their claims individually in arbitration, then classwide
arbitration undoubtedly offers a superior option.157 There are at least
three reasons why this is true.
1. Corporate Accountability
The West Virginia Supreme Court recently stated that permitting
consumer companies to employ arbitration clauses that prohibit class
relief “would go a long way toward allowing those who commit illegal
activity to go unpunished, undeterred, and unaccountable.”158 While
deterrence is a questionable rationale for promoting classwide arbitration,159 holding consumer businesses accountable for illegal conduct is a definite benefit of protecting and developing the class arbitration system.160 Companies employ mandatory arbitration clauses
that preclude all class relief to discourage consumers from seeking
legal redress. Any arbitration clause that attempts to avoid corporate
accountability through a complete prohibition on class relief deserves
judicial invalidation. Companies should not be able to create “virtual
immunity”161 from class relief, and permitting states to proscribe this
activity will hold corporations accountable for their actions.
1087, 1104-05 (W.D. Mich. 2000); In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 843 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999);
Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867-68 (Ct. App. 2002); Powertel, Inc. v.
Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d
265, 280 (W. Va. 2002). But see Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, The Gold Rush of
2002: California Courts Lure Plaintiffs’ Lawyers (but Undermine Federal Arbitration Act)
by Refusing to Enforce “No-Class Action” Clauses in Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 58
BUS. LAW. 1289, 1290-91 (2003) (arguing that courts should respect parties’ arbitration
agreements even if they are adhesive in nature and citing several courts that have done
so).
157. Sternlight, supra note 156, at 44; see also Lewis v. Prudential Bache Secs., Inc.,
225 Cal. Rptr. 69, 75 (Ct. App. 1986):
The alternative . . . is to force each . . . customer to individually arbitrate
claims, most of which probably cannot justify the time and money required to
prove. This case appears to offer no great difficulty in adapting arbitration to fit
the class action mold, with adequate judicial supervision over the class aspects.
Id. at 75.
158. Berger, 567 S.E.2d at 278-79.
159. See John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7 (1991) (questioning the deterrent effect of corporate
regulations); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 237 (2000) (questioning the role of deterrence in jury awards).
160. See Berger, 567 S.E.2d at 278-79; see also Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868:
By imposing this clause on its customers, Discover has essentially granted itself a license to push the boundaries of good business practices to their furthest
limits, fully aware that relatively few, if any, customers will seek legal remedies, and that any remedies obtained will only pertain to that single customer
without collateral estoppel effect. The potential for millions of customers to be
overcharged small amounts without an effective method of redress cannot be
ignored. Therefore, the provision violates fundamental notions of fairness.
161. Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867 (stating that class relief prohibitions create “virtual immunity from class or representative actions despite their potential merit”); Keating,
183 Cal. Rptr. at 375 (“If the right to a classwide proceeding could be automatically elimi-
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2. Imperfect Information
Individual suits cannot serve the accountability function because
many consumers are unaware of their potential claims against a
company. If they do not know about the potential claims, then they
cannot bring the individual suit. Therefore, allowing consumer companies to force individual resolution of consumer claims will significantly reduce their exposure to liability from corporate wrongdoing.
One of the benefits of classwide arbitration is that it requires the
parties to give notice to all potential class members.162 Thus, a single
informed consumer can initiate a class proceeding and inform all
class members about the potential recovery.163
3. Economic Feasibility
Even if individual consumers could easily learn of potential claims
that they might have against consumer businesses, it is economically
impractical for them to individually initiate the typical consumer action because most claims of this nature have a “negative value.”164
The potential recovery to the individual would be too small and the
potential costs of the litigation would be too large to give the consumer an adequate incentive to file the claim.165 Most attorneys
would refuse to accept a case with such a minimal potential return,
and “the vast majority of consumer claims involving relatively small
sums of money . . . will be left without a remedy.”166 Classwide arbitration solves this problem by “provid[ing] small claimants with a
method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too
small to warrant individual litigation.”167
C. The Defendant’s Economic Justification for Class Relief
Prohibitions
Defendants in consumer actions have an economic argument of
their own. They claim that arbitration clauses allow consumer businesses to lower their operating costs and pass those savings on to
nated in relationships governed by adhesion contracts through the inclusion of a provision
for arbitration, the potential for undercutting these class action principles, and for chilling
the effective protection of interests common to a group, would be substantial.”).
162. See AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC., SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS
(effective Oct. 8, 2003), at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747&
JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules_Procedures\National_International\..\Topics_Interest
\AAAClassaction.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2004) [hereinafter AAA CLASS RULES].
163. Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming March 2004) (manuscript at 19, on file with author).
164. Id. (manuscript at 18) (citing affidavit of Professor Edward F. Sherman).
165. Id.
166. In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 842 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999).
167. Keating v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360, 374 (1982).
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customers.168 Essentially, these businesses advocate that prohibitions
on class relief benefit consumers. This Section examines the efficient
market theory and behavioralism in an effort to judge the legitimacy
of the consumer businesses’ stance that lower costs to consumers
should be the overriding concern in determining whether to allow
prohibitions on class relief.
1. Efficient Markets?
Ultimately, the degree to which prohibitions on class relief result
in lower costs to consumers is an empirical question, and, so far, no
empirical data exists.169 Nevertheless, one can make assumptions
about the extent that companies return savings to consumers based
on general economic theory.170 Stated simply, whether a company will
return savings to consumers rather than keep them as profits depends on the level of competition in that company’s market. The only
time consumers can absolutely expect to see such a return is when
perfect competition exists.171 However, perfect competition rarely exists, especially among national consumer companies.172 Barriers to
entry, dominant sellers, and heterogeneous products—factors that
evidence imperfect competition—all exist in the major consumer
markets.173 Thus, taking the position that consumer businesses return savings to consumers is a questionable position at best, and it
168. See, e.g., Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 419 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[A]rbitration
offers cost-saving benefits to telecommunication providers and ‘these benefits are reflected
in a lower cost of doing business that in competition are passed along to customers.’”) (citing E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Communications Int’l, Inc., 294 F.3d 924,
927 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1090 (2002)); see also Stephen J. Ware, Paying
the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J.
DISP. RESOL. 89, 91 (“Assuming that consumer arbitration agreements lower the disputeresolution costs of businesses that use them, competition will (over time) force these businesses to pass their cost-savings to consumers.”).
169. Drahozal, supra note 37, at 764; see also Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 163
(manuscript at 28) (“It is not surprising that, to date, no published studies show that the
imposition of mandatory arbitration leads to lower prices.”).
170. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 163 (manuscript at 24-33); see also Drahozal, supra note 37, at 765:
In the absence of empirical evidence, whether one believes that individuals
benefit from arbitration through reduced prices and higher wages, or instead
that corporations use arbitration to take advantage of individuals and avoid
their legal obligations, depends largely on one’s faith in the market as a means
of allocating resources.
171. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 163 (manuscript at 25).
172. See id. (manuscript at 26-27). Perfect competition only exists when four factors
are present. First, there must be a sufficient amount of small buyers and small sellers so
that one buyer or seller cannot manipulate the market. Second, the goods should be homogeneous, so that no company sells a unique product. Third, barriers to entry in the market
must be very low. Finally, the market should be efficient in terms of information availability. Id. (manuscript at 25-26).
173. See id. (manuscript at 26-27). But see Ware, supra note 168, at 91 (assuming
without discussion that no barriers to entry exist in a market economy).
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provides a weak argument for allowing companies to preclude all
class relief.
Even if consumer businesses did return savings to consumers in
the form of lower costs, lower costs are not the primary concern.
Based on the accountability and economic rationales discussed above,
courts should not allow consumer businesses to create “virtual immunity”174 from class relief. In fact, “the notion that it is to the public’s advantage that companies be relieved of legal liability for their
wrongdoing . . . is contrary to a century of consumer protection
laws.”175 Thus, slightly higher costs are worthwhile if the alternative
is allowing consumer businesses to continue with the illegal activity.
2. Recognizing Behavioralism as a Legitimate Concern?
While some consumers might be willing to pay slightly higher
prices to preserve an opportunity to vindicate their rights, others
might be willing to trade that opportunity for potentially lower costs,
regardless of whether the lower costs will actually materialize and
regardless of whether they will ever be in a situation where they
would want to vindicate their rights. Essentially, consumers tend to
be overoptimistic, believing—perhaps irrationally—that such a situation will never occur. Thus, even assuming that consumers would accept binding arbitration in return for a lower price—which itself assumes that consumers accept the doubtful proposition that consumer
companies return reduced costs to their customers—regulation to
prevent companies from completely precluding class relief may be
necessary to protect consumers from their own behavior.176
Should regulations be based solely on the basis of protecting consumers from their own (potentially irrational) behavior? The answer
is debatable.177 Ultimately, however, legal rules should not be created
exclusively on (potentially false) assumptions about the rationality of
consumers.178 Nevertheless, this does not mean that companies
should be able to preclude all forms of class relief if a group of consumers is willing to (perhaps irrationally) go along with it. Parallel
concerns—namely, accountability for illegal conduct—exist to reinforce the need for placing a prohibition on companies from participat174. See Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating
that class relief prohibitions create “virtual immunity from class or representative actions
despite their potential merit”).
175. Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 931 n.16 (N.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d in part, Ting
v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
176. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 163 (manuscript at 29-30).
177. Compare Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999), with Gregory
Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New
Behavioral Analysis of the Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002).
178. See Mitchell, supra note 177, at 2021.
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ing in such activities. Thus, while basing regulation solely on assumptions about consumers’ rationality is problematic, additional
overriding concerns justify preventing companies from proscribing
class relief.
D. States as Testing Grounds
The FAA does not provide detailed coverage of the arbitration
process or the role that arbitrators play in that process.179 For example, it does not specify how arbitrators should handle discovery, the
availability of injunctive relief, requests for summary judgment, or—
most significantly in terms of this Comment—consolidation of multiple arbitrations.180 Clarification on these issues must come from the
states.
Since classwide arbitration is a relatively new phenomenon, states
will want to develop rules and procedures to ensure the system is fair
and efficient. This is a perfect role for the states as they can act as
testing grounds to determine which procedures work and which do
not.181 Indeed, states should start adopting procedures for classwide
arbitration as soon as possible. This will give the Supreme Court an
additional incentive to return greater authority over arbitration procedures to the states when it resolves the split between the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits. The following Section describes some of the procedures that are particularly relevant for classwide arbitration that
states should consider.
V. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS FOR CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION
One of the most widely debated “obstacles” to classwide arbitration is the extent of judicial oversight that may be necessary to protect the due process rights of the parties.182 Essentially, courts and
179. Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 200.
180. Id. at 200. According to Hayford & Palmiter, “the Supreme Court’s decision in Volt
can be seen as an invitation for greater state participation in areas outside the FAA preemptive core.” Id. at 211-12; see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (stating that the FAA does not “reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration”).
181. See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 11, at 211-12. How should states go about developing the classwide arbitration system? Relying on courts to develop classwide arbitration rules on a case-by-case basis through judicial interpretation of existing state arbitration acts may take years or even decades to create a coherent set of procedures. Asking
state legislatures, on the other hand, to adopt bright line rules that would assist in the development and institutionalization of the classwide arbitration system seems like a more
efficient approach. Id.
182. See Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 491-92 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating
that there are “no insurmountable obstacle[s]” to classwide arbitration and that limited judicial oversight is necessary to make the system work), vacated, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982),
overturned on other grounds, Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see also
Sternlight, supra note 156, at 111-13 (arguing that courts must make the class certification

2004]

CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

1031

commentators disagree over the court’s involvement in the classwide
arbitration process. Should the court select the arbitrator, certify the
class, and assist in providing adequate notice to the class members?
Or, may the arbitrator and parties perform these tasks? Earlier this
year, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) adopted a set of
supplemental rules on classwide arbitration that accept the latter alternative and place all of the procedural responsibilities in the hands
of the parties and the arbitrator.183 The remainder of this Section examines the AAA rules and discusses whether states may want to
adopt these rules outright or adopt additional safeguards that may
better protect both defendants and the class.
A. Selecting the Arbitrator
Unlike litigation, arbitration allows the parties to select the decision maker.184 If the parties agree to have only one arbitrator, then
the procedure employed by the AAA is a common method of selecting
decision and assist in providing adequate notice to class members); Note, Classwide Arbitration: Efficient Adjudication or Procedural Quagmire?, 67 VA. L. REV. 787, 806-808
(1981) (arguing that arbitrators should make the class certification decision). The Virginia
Law Review Note proposes that due process may not even apply in arbitration because
there is no requisite state action. Id. at 800. However, this is unlikely because (1) parties
cannot easily waive due process rights, and (2) some state action will probably be essential
in classwide arbitration. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-96 (1972) (discussing considerations relevant to waiver of due process); Sternlight, supra note 156, at 111-13 (arguing that courts must make the class certification decision and assist in providing adequate
notice to class members).
183. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 2. The AAA adopted these rules after
the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402
(2003). In Bazzle, the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide whether an arbitration agreement
that is silent regarding the availability of classwide arbitration actually permits the parties to proceed on a classwide basis. Id. at 2404. The South Carolina Supreme Court originally decided (1) that the arbitration agreement was silent as to whether parties could proceed with a classwide arbitration, and (2) that, given this silence, South Carolina law interprets the contracts as permitting class arbitration proceedings. Id. The U.S. Supreme
Court, in a plurality opinion, decided that this was essentially an issue of contract interpretation and that the arbitrator, and not the court, must make the decision. Id. at 2408.
Therefore, the Court vacated the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remanded the case to be resolved by the arbitrator. Id. Only three Justices joined Justice
Breyer’s plurality opinion. Justice Stevens—solely in order to have a controlling opinion—
concurred in the judgment, but dissented on the Court’s decision to vacate the decision of
the South Carolina Supreme Court. See id. at 2408-09. Stevens concluded that nothing in
the FAA precluded the South Carolina Supreme Court from making the determination
that the contract permitted classwide arbitration. Id. at 2408. Justice Thomas offered his
standard dissent that the FAA should not apply in state courts and that the Court should
have respected the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court. Id. at 2411.
184. Drahozal, supra note 37, at 708-09. This discussion assumes that the original contract did not name the arbitrator or arbitrators in advance. If the parties named the arbitrator(s) in advance, this raises another ethical concern. The arbitrator(s) may be biased in
favor of the company that drafted the contract. However, even if the parties did name the
arbitrator(s) in advance, the conflict checks required by the AAA rules—along with the arbitrator’s and arbitration institution’s financial incentive to avoid any appearance of bias–are sufficient to ensure a fair award.
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that person.185 Parties must agree on an arbitrator from a list provided by the AAA, and submit that name to the AAA for approval.186
If the parties cannot agree on one name, they must strike all objectionable names and rank the remainder in order of preference.187 The
highest ranking arbitrator wins.188 For a panel of three arbitrators,
the parties each choose one, and those two choose the third.189 The
same principles apply in classwide arbitrations, but the procedure is
slightly different. The Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations
require parties to select at least one arbitrator from the AAA’s “national roster of class arbitration arbitrators.”190
Since the class attorney makes the selection for the class, an important due process concern arises in the selection process.191 The
class attorney may attempt to choose an arbitrator who will act in
the best interest of the class attorney rather than that of the class.
Professor Sternlight contends that courts must occupy a role in selecting the arbitrator in classwide proceedings to protect absent class
members.192 “Without court supervision of the formation and treatment of the arbitral class action, this means that the absent class
members will ultimately be bound by the ruling of an arbitrator they
had absolutely no role in selecting.”193
While it may be true that the class attorney and class members
have potentially conflicting interests,194 Professor Sternlight’s concerns are slightly overstated. The class attorney has an ethical duty
to act in the best interest of the class as a whole by selecting a fair
and unbiased arbitrator. The arbitrator, in turn, has a duty to dis-

185. See AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
P ROCEDURES Rule 11 (amended and effective July 1, 2003), available at
http://www.adr.org/index2.1jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules_Proced
ures\National_International\..\..\focusArea\commercial\AAA235current.htm (last visited Feb. 29, 2004) [hereinafter AAA COMMERCIAL RULES].
186. Id. at Rule 11(a).
187. Id. at Rule 11(b).
188. Id.
189. Id. at Rule 13(c).
190. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 2(a).
191. Sternlight, supra note 156, at 111-12.
192. Id. Another common argument against arbitration in general is the effect that “repeat player” status may have on the outcome of the arbitration. Essentially, some commentators argue that corporations, as “repeat players” in arbitration, have a distinct advantage
because arbitrators have an incentive to award in favor of the corporation so that the corporation will repeatedly choose that arbitrator. However, such an argument ignores three
important facts. First, both parties to an arbitration participate in the selection process.
Second, plaintiff’s attorneys may also be “repeat players.” Finally, arbitration institutions
go to great lengths to remove any possibility of bias, including the enactment of disclosure
rules that arbitrators must comply with before being approved for a particular case. See
Drahozal, supra note 37, at 709-10, 751, 769-70.
193. Sternlight, supra note 156, at 112.
194. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1417-21 (1995).
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close any conflicts of interest that may prevent him or her from rendering a fair opinion.195 Additionally, arbitration institutions have
great financial incentives to avoid any appearance of bias. If an institution obtains a reputation for bias, it risks losing credibility, which
courts rely upon to enforce arbitral awards.196 “There is little reason
to use an institution whose awards are not enforced by the courts.”197
Accordingly, arbitration organizations take special precautions to ensure that their arbitrators are fair and unbiased.
Based on this reasoning, requiring courts to oversee the selection
of the arbitrator in a class arbitration proceeding seems unnecessary.
Sufficient safeguards exist to ensure that all parties—defendants,
named plaintiffs, and absent class members—receive a fair decisionmaker. Thus, states should be satisfied with the current level of protections in the selection process.
B. Contract Interpretation & Class Certification
Under Rule 3 of the AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, the first duty of the arbitrator is to determine, in a written
opinion, whether the arbitration agreement permits the arbitration
to proceed on a classwide basis.198 Essentially, the arbitrator interprets the contract and then issues what the rules call a “Clause Construction Award.”199 Following the issuance of the award, parties
have thirty days to ask a court of competent jurisdiction to confirm or
vacate the arbitrator’s decision.200 After the court confirms or vacates
the decision, it returns the case to the arbitrator who then has to decide—under Rule 4 of the AAA’s Supplementary Rules—whether to

195. See AAA COMMERCIAL RULES, supra note 185, at Rule 16(a):
Any person appointed or to be appointed as an arbitrator shall disclose to the
AAA any circumstance likely to give rise to justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence, including any bias or any financial or personal interest in the result of the arbitration or any past or present relationship
with the parties or their representatives. Such obligation shall remain in effect
throughout the arbitration.
196. Drahozal, supra note 37, at 752.
197. Id. at 769.
198. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 3. By allowing the arbitrator to make
the contract interpretation, the rules are consistent with Bazzle, but Bazzle is only a plurality opinion. 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003). Justices Breyer, Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg felt
that the arbitrator should make the contract interpretation. Id. at 2408. Justices
Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Kennedy felt that the South Carolina Supreme Court was the
correct body to make the contract interpretation, but that the South Carolina Court made
an incorrect ruling. Id. at 2409. Justice Stevens felt that the court should not disturb the
decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, but voted to allow the arbitrator to interpret the contract so that the court would have a controlling opinion. Id. at 2408-09. Justice
Thomas issued his standard dissent that the FAA does not apply in state courts and that
the Court should let the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court stand. Id. at 2411.
199. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 3.
200. Id.

1034

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1005

certify the class.201 Rule 4 essentially mirrors Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure by outlining the conditions that the arbitrator should consider when making the certification decision.202 If the
arbitrator chooses to certify the class, each party again has thirty
days to ask a court of competent jurisdiction to confirm or vacate the
award.203
There are three concerns with the AAA’s certification process.
First, it creates a potential financial conflict of interest for the arbitrator. Also, it may not adequately protect the due process rights of
the parties. Finally, it may be more complicated and time-consuming
than necessary. Each is a legitimate concern that states should consider before adopting similar rules.
1. A Financial Conflict of Interest?
Arbitrators may have a financial incentive to certify a class because the longer the arbitrator spends on the case the more money
the arbitrator receives. This seems like a fairly strong argument in
favor of letting the court certify the class. However, the concern is
misplaced. As discussed in Part V.A, arbitration institutions, and arbitrators as well, have incredibly strong financial incentives to avoid
any appearance of bias. They simply cannot survive economically if
they cannot maintain an impartial appearance.204 Thus, the existence
of a potential financial conflict of interest should not prevent the arbitrator from making the certification decision because sufficient
safeguards exist to neutralize the potential conflict.

201. Id. at Rule 4(a).
202. See id. Rule 4(a) of the AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration requires
the following elements:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of separate arbitrations on behalf of all
members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class;
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class;
(5) counsel selected to represent the class will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class; and
(6) each class member has entered into an agreement containing an arbitration
clause which is substantially similar to that signed by the class representative(s) and each of the other class members.
Id. at Rule 4(a); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
203. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 5(d).
204. See Drahozal, supra note 37, at 709, 752, 769-70. If an institution obtains a reputation for bias, it risks losing credibility, which courts rely upon to enforce arbitral awards.
Id. at 752. “There is little reason to use an institution whose awards are not enforced by
the courts.” Id. at 769.
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2. Protecting Due Process?
The process of certification is critical because it determines not
only whether plaintiffs may initiate a representative suit, but also
how that suit will be structured to ensure that the class members’ interests are adequately represented.205 Thus, “[w]hether a class is certified and how its membership is defined can often have a decisive effect not only on the outcome of the litigation[,] but also on its management.”206 Because of this, Professor Sternlight believes that allowing arbitrators to decide the certification issue will not comply with
the Due Process Clause.207 According to Sternlight, “judges are substantially burdened by the responsibility of protecting the interests of
absent class members, and . . . [arbitrators] may not yet have
reached the point at which they are deemed equally capable of protecting individuals’ critical due process interests.”208 However, some
evidence contrary to Professor Sternlight’s view exists. Arbitrators
often handle large, complex disputes.209 The AAA, for example, has a
“national roster of class arbitration arbitrators” who are especially
skilled to handle classwide arbitration cases.210 Additionally, arbitrators handling class arbitrations will have the assistance of the parties’ counsel and the parties’ experts during the certification stage.
Finally, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4 of
the AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations provide sufficient guidance to assist the arbitrator in making the class determination.211 Thus, given arbitrators’ training and experience, and the
various means of assistance available to arbitrators during the certification process, arbitrators are sufficiently capable of protecting the
due process interests of absent class members.212

205. Sternlight, supra note 156, at 112.
206. Id. (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX CIVIL LITIGATION § 30.1 (3d ed. 1995)).
207. Id. at 112-14.
208. Id. at 113-14.
209. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (stating
that “arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling the factual and legal complexities
of antitrust claims, notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction and supervision”);
see also Note, supra note 182, at 806-08 (arguing that arbitrators should make the class
certification decision).
210. See AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 2(a).
211. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 4.
212. See Note, supra note 182, at 806-08; see also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123
S. Ct. 2402, 2408 (2003) (remanding the case to allow the arbitrator to determine whether
the arbitration agreement permitted class actions). In Bazzle, the arbitrator already had
made one class determination and a class award. Id. at 2405. However, the Court remanded the case for the arbitrator to make the decision again because the Court believed
the first decision may have been influenced by the lower court. Id. at 2408.
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3. Streamlining the Procedures
Even though arbitrators are qualified to interpret the contract
and make the class certification decision, the AAA’s procedure regarding these decisions seems unnecessarily excessive and timeconsuming. After both the Clause Construction Award and the Class
Determination Award, the arbitrator issues a thirty day stay to allow
parties to appeal the decision to a court of competent jurisdiction.213
Instead of issuing a thirty day stay after each award, why not have
the arbitrator make both decisions at the same time and let the court
review them simultaneously? This would reduce both the length of
the arbitration and the burden on the reviewing court. Alternatively,
the arbitrator could issue the Clause Construction Award, send it to
the reviewing court for confirmation, and allow the court to make the
class certification decision while it reviews the arbitrator’s decision
on the Construction Award. This might alleviate some of the due
process and financial conflicts of interest concerns discussed in Parts
V.B.1 & V.B.2 above. However, allowing the court to become so intricately involved at this stage “might infringe on the procedural flexibility traditionally accorded to arbitrators.”214 Therefore, states may
want to adopt a policy where (1) the arbitrator makes the contract interpretation and the certification decision at the same time, and (2)
the court does not review the decisions until it reviews the final
award. This would allow the reviewing court to evaluate all of the
arbitrator’s decisions at once and maintain some of the procedural
flexibility inherent in the arbitration process.215
Any of these options could work. The point is that it is not entirely
clear which option is the best. Because it is unclear, this is a good
area for states to adopt differing policies and act as “testing grounds”
to determine which procedure is the most desirable and why.
Through experimentation at the early stages of classwide arbitration’s development, states can assist in building a more sound class
arbitration system by developing the most fair and efficient certification process possible.
C. Notice & Settlement
Regardless of who makes the certification decision, the arbitrator
should undertake the responsibility of overseeing the notification
process. Rule 6 of the AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations directs arbitrators to ensure that class members receive ade213. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rules 3, 5(d).
214. Note, supra note 182, at 807-08 (arguing that the arbitrator should make the class
certification decision and a court should not review it until the court reviews the final
award).
215. See id.
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quate notice in concise, plain, and “easily understood language.”216
Rule 6 also provides detailed guidance on what information the notice form should contain.217 Basically, the AAA’s Supplementary
Rules are easy to understand, simple to implement, and well within
the arbitrator’s area of professional competence. The same is true for
the AAA’s Rule 8 on settlement. The arbitrator simply has to approve
any deal reached between the parties, as long as the arbitrator determines the deal is reasonable to all class members.218 Accordingly,
the arbitrator should have control over the notice and settlement
procedures.
However, one aspect of the AAA’s rule on settlements may concern
some states. Rule 8 gives the arbitrator the power to refuse any settlement that does not give class members a second chance to opt
out.219 This rule “reflects concern that inertia and a lack of understanding may cause many class members to ignore the original exclusion opportunity, while the identification of proposed binding settlement terms may encourage a more thoughtful response.”220 The objection to such a rule is that a second opt out period will make it
more difficult for the parties to reach a settlement agreement.221
However, Rule 8 avoids this problem by providing the arbitrator with
sufficient discretionary authority to make case-by-case determinations on whether a second opt out is necessary based on the circumstances surrounding the arbitration.222 Therefore, giving the arbitra216. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 6(b).
217. Id. The Notice must concisely state in plain, easily understood language:
(1) the nature of the action;
(2) the definition of the class certified;
(3) the class claims, issues, or defenses;
(4) that a class member may enter an appearance through counsel if the member so desires, and that any class member may attend the hearings;
(5) that the arbitrator will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, stating when and how members may elect to be excluded;
(6) the binding effect of a class judgment on class members;
(7) the identity and biographical information about the arbitrator, the class
representative(s) and class counsel that have been approved by the arbitrator
to represent the class; and
(8) how and to whom a class member may communicate about the class arbitration, including information about the AAA Class Arbitration Docket (see Rule
9).
Id. In fact, the AAA’s notice provisions mimic the requirements of the Federal Judicial
Center’s proposed amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
took effect in December of 2003. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (Federal Judicial Center,
Proposed Draft) (effective Dec. 2003) [hereinafter PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 23].
218. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 8.
219. Id. at Rule 8(c).
220. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 23, supra note 217, at 40. The AAA’s Supplementary Rules on Class Arbitration are modeled after the proposed amendments to Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2003.
221. See id. at 41.
222. See id.

1038

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1005

tor the authority to refuse any settlement that fails to offer a repeat
opt out period should help rather than harm the class arbitration
proceeding.
D. Reasoned Opinions
Possibly the most positive aspect of the AAA’s Supplementary
Rules for Class Arbitrations is that the rules require the arbitrator to
explain—in written opinions—all decisions made during the process.
Commercial arbitration awards typically do not set forth the facts of
the dispute, do not identify the applicable law and contract language,
and do not explain how the arbitrator applied the applicable law and
contract language to the facts in order to resolve the parties’ disagreement.223 Rules 3, 5, and 7 of the AAA’s Supplemental Rules for
Class Arbitrations alter this traditional feature of arbitration by requiring the arbitrator to provide written opinions at three stages in
the arbitration hearing. First, the arbitrator has to explain his or her
initial contract interpretation in a “Clause Construction Award.”224
Afterwards, in the certification proceeding, the arbitrator has to provide a reasoned opinion for why the class should or should not be certified.225 Finally, the arbitrator has to issue a written final award on
the merits of the arbitration.226
Considering the size and complexity of classwide hearings, reasoned opinions seem necessary to ensure that arbitrators accurately
understood the nature of the controversy. In fact, requiring reasoned
opinions will eliminate some of the uncertainty associated with arbitration hearings and will provide benefits to both plaintiffs and defendants. First, written opinions will reassure parties that the arbitrator committed time and gave thought to their dispute.227 A reasoned opinion shows respect for parties’ views. Futhermore, the opinion requirement will reduce the likelihood of parties feeling that the
arbitrator treated them unfairly.228 More importantly, without a reasoned opinion, parties do not know how to attack the award on appeal.229 “By forgoing a reasoned award, the arbitrator renders undiscoverable the primary bases upon which an attempt to vacate the
award can be founded: inaccurate arbitral findings of fact, incorrect
223. Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the
Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 443, 444 (1998).
224. AAA CLASS RULES, supra note 162, at Rule 3.
225. Id. at Rule 5.
226. Id. at Rule 7.
227. Christopher B. Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice: Why Public Law
Arbitrators Should Be Required to Issue Written, Publishable Opinions, 4 EMPLOYEE
RIGHTS & EMP. POL’Y J. 285, 314-15 (2000).
228. Id.
229. Id.
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interpretations or applications of relevant law or contract language,
or both.”230 Consequently, the absence of a reasoned opinion means
that judicial vacatur is virtually precluded.231 While reasoned opinions will subject arbitration awards to greater judicial scrutiny—and
thereby increase the costs of arbitration—the requirement is necessary to protect the parties’ right to appeal under Section 10 of the
FAA,232 especially in the context of classwide arbitration.233 Therefore, the benefits to reasoned awards far outweigh their potential
costs, and instituting a reasoned opinion requirement in the early
stages of classwide arbitration’s development is an appropriate and
necessary measure to ensure that classwide arbitration is a fair and
efficient proceeding for all parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the last fifty years, the Supreme Court has developed a “national policy favoring arbitration”234 by expanding the preemptive effect of the Federal Arbitration Act far beyond Congress’ original intent.235 Many lower courts have relied on this “national policy” to effectively eliminate any review of arbitration agreements under state
laws of unconscionability. As a result, the Supreme Court has unwittingly encouraged companies to employ arbitration clauses in consumer contracts as a method of depriving consumers of certain types
of relief. Banks, phone companies, and other large consumer businesses now use mandatory arbitration agreements to immunize
themselves from class actions and classwide arbitration. As potential
defendants, they hope that courts will rely on the Supreme Court’s
“national policy” to uphold their arbitration agreements and force individual resolution of all consumer claims against them.

230. Hayford, supra note 223, at 445.
231. Id.
232. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). Judicial review under § 10 of the
FAA is limited to four grounds: fraud, partiality, misconduct in refusing to postpone a
hearing, and an arbitrator exceeding his or her powers. Id. § 10(a)(1)-(4). Additionally, all
of the federal circuits, and several of the states, have adopted manifest disregard as an
added ground for vacatur. See 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 33.08 (2003).
233. Organizations other than the AAA are also starting to acknowledge the potential
value of having arbitrators provide written opinions. For example, in the Center for Public
Resources’ proposed rules and commentary for the arbitration of business disputes, the
Center stated that “[a]ll awards shall be in writing and shall state the reasoning on which
the award rests unless the parties agree otherwise.” CTR. FOR PUB. RES. INST. FOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION Rule 14.2 (effective Sept. 15,
2000), available at www.cpradr.org/arb-rules.htm#14 (last visited Feb. 29, 2004).
234. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
235. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); id. at 285 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Southland, 465 U.S. at 25 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S.
395, 420 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Drahozal, supra note 37, at 701.
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Should the “national policy” work as a shield to protect defendants
from having to provide any form of class relief? The Supreme Court
will have an opportunity to address this question when it resolves a
split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits on the interplay of the
Federal Arbitration Act, the Federal Communications Act, and state
laws of unconscionability.236 Considering the Court’s sensible desire
to sustain the legitimacy of its “national policy” in favor of arbitration, one practical compromise would be to uphold the parties’
agreement to arbitrate, but allow state law to determine whether the
arbitration may proceed on a classwide basis. This proposal maintains the “national policy favoring arbitration” while returning additional authority over arbitration procedure to the states.
Currently, only a few states have explicitly adopted classwide arbitration as an alternative form of dispute resolution. However, when
faced with the possibility of accepting classwide arbitration or allowing companies to continue avoiding class relief, presumably most—if
not all—states will adopt a system of classwide arbitration. In fact, if
states start accepting such a system now, and adopting rules and
procedures to develop it, this will give the Supreme Court greater incentive to return authority over arbitration policies to them when it
resolves the split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.

236. Compare Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding (1) that the
Federal Communications Act does not preempt state laws of unconscionability, and (2) that
the FAA does preempt the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act’s ban on waivers of
class actions, but that the FAA makes arbitration agreements subject to state laws of unconscionability, which the 9th Circuit used to invalidate the parties’ agreement in this
case), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003), with Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir.
2002) (holding that the Federal Communication Act preempts state laws of unconscionability).

